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CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances
rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative to the
disposition of the issues of this case other than §30-3-3 Utah Code
Ann.

(1953

as

amended)(award

of

attorney's

fees

in

divorce

actions), and §30-3-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)(disposition
of property and payment of support).
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POINT I
THE TRUST AGREEMENT WHICH THE
PARTIES SIGNED, TRANSFERRED PROPERTY
INTO, AND DID NOT REVOKE WAS A VALID
POST NUPTIAL AGREEMENT WHICH SHOULD
BE UPHELD AND ENFORCED
In his Reply Brief, Mr. Kirk argues that the trust agreement
which he and Mrs. Kirk signed after their marriage was nothing more
than an estate planning device. That argument might have merit but
for the circumstances which existed and led to the formal execution
of the trust and the transfer of specific assets by both parties
into that trust.
In analyzing the evidence presented at trial, it is clear that
the principal reason for creating the trust was not an estate

planning device as Mr. Kirk argues, but rather as a means of
providing

Mrs. Kirk with

a degree

of

financial

security

in

connection with her marriage to Mr. Kirk at a time when she was in
her mid sixties. She expressed those concerns because she had seen
friends in similar situations who were simply "thrown out" after a
marriage in later life. (R-539)

The execution of the trust after

the parties* marriage and the transfer of property into that trust
were voluntary acts by both parties to address and deal with those
concerns.

In other words, the trust was a post-nuptial agreement

which set forth the understanding of the parties as to their
interests in each other's property as a result of their marriage to
one another.
In not upholding and enforcing the agreement, the trial court
allowed Mr. Kirk to escape valid contractual obligations to Mr.
Kirk when there was no legal basis which would otherwise permit him
to do so.
The trial court's handling of this issue becomes even more
unfair when considered with the fact that it was Mr. Kirk who
wanted to terminate the marriage and refused to try and save it
even though Mrs. Kirk was willing to do so.

(R-398)

Mr. Kirk's Reply to Point IV of Mrs. Kirk's Brief entirely
misses the point. He cites cases which deal with the issue of premarital

property

Agreement.
standards

but

not

in

the

context

He then addresses pre-nuptial
which

are

applicable

to them

of

a

Post-Nuptial

agreements and the

but

not

post-nuptial

agreements and their related standards.
In this case, what the Kirks had was a contract reduced to
writing and signed after their marriage which provided that they
2

would

share

properties.

and
Both

equally
parties

enjoy

their

agreed

to

respective
that

premarital

arrangement

and

transferred their real estate and some bank accounts into the trust
with the further understanding that the income generated by this
property would likewise be shared equally by the parties.
As was recently stated in Beesley v. Harris, 249 Utah Adv.
Rep. 34 (Utah Supreme Court filed October 14, 1994)
Post-marital
agreements,
like
premarital
ones,
are
generally
subject
to
ordinary
contract
principles. See D'Aston v. D'Aston,
808 P.2d 111, 112-13 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). One of the cornerstone rules
of contract law is that an agreement
must
be
supported
by
adequate
consideration. Resources Mqt. Co v.
Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706
P.2d
1028,
1036
(Utah
1985).
Consideration is an act or promise
bargained for and given in exchange
for a promise.
Id. Consideration
may be found "whenever a promisor
receives a benefit or where [a]
promisee
suffers
a
detriment,
however slight."
Gasser v. H o m e ,
557 P.2d 154, 155 (Utah 1976); see
Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610
P.2d
1369,
1372
(Utah
1980);
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764
P. 2d 628, 632 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Whether a particular benefit or
detriment may serve as consideration
to support an enforceable contract
is a question of law which we review
for correctness.
See Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, 840
P.2d 851, 860 (Wash. 1992). Id. at
38
The agreement at issue in this case contains mutual promises
in which both Mr. and Mrs. Kirk suffered a legal detriment.

Each

conveyed property into the trust, when, but for the agreement,
there was no obligation

to do so.

Likewise, each received a

corresponding benefit - Mr. Kirk, the marital partner he desired
3

and

Mrs.

Kirk

the

financial

security

she

needed

from

the

relationship.
In finding that the trust agreement was merely an estate
planning device, the trial court erroneously overlooked and did not
consider the real reason for its creation - to provide Mrs. Kirk
with an adequate comfort level related to her future financial
security as the wife of Mr. Kirk.

The actual affect of the trial

court's ruling was to give Mr. Kirk the divorce he wanted and allow
him

to

unilaterally

avoid

valid

post-nuptial,

contractual

obligations he owed to Mrs. Kirk.
To the extent property was actually transferred into the trust
as

a

part

of

the

parties1

post-nuptial

agreement,

it

is

respectfully requested that this Court uphold that agreement and
divide that property equally between the parties.

POINT II
MR. KIRK HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS AND
RESPOND TO THE REQUIREMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT TO SET FORTH ITS REASONS
FOR
AWARDING
MRS.
KIRK
LESS
ATTORNEY'S
FEES
THAN
SHE
HAD
REQUESTED.
Mr. Kirk's Response to Point V of Mrs. Kirk's Brief (page 20
of Mr. Kirk's Reply Brief) simply does not address Mrs. Kirk's
argument that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to
Mrs. Kirk in an amount less than she had requested and not setting
forth its reasons for awarding a reduced amount.

Failure to set

forth those reasons constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial
court and results in reversible error. (Haumont v. Haumont, 739
P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990).
4

Point V of Mrs. Kirk's Brief is correct in all respects.
Based upon the parties* respective financial situations as found by
the trial court, Mrs. Kirk should be awarded all of her attorney's
fees and costs incurred at the district court level.

This issue

should be remanded to the trial court with a directive to award
Mrs. Kirk all of those fees.

POINT III
MRS. KIRK, NOT MR. KIRK, IS ENTITLED
TO BE AWARDED THE ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS SHE HAS INCURRED IN
CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL
Mr. Kirk has failed in his burden to demonstrate that the
trial court committed any error whatsoever in connection with
decision related to the alimony award.

its

He has further failed to

show that Mrs. Kirk was not entitled to an award of attorney's
fees.

Simply put, there is substantial evidence in the record to

support both awards.

The trial court found Mrs. Kirk's evidence

on these issues to be more credible and persuasive than Mr. Kirks.
Such is the prerogative of the trial court.
Mrs. Kirk has also carried her burden in demonstrating that
the trial court erred in not enforcing the post nuptial trust
agreement which the parties agreed to, signed, and transferred
property into.

The record also contains substantial evidence

related to Mrs. Kirk's overall financial condition vis' a vis that
of Mr. Kirk.

The requisite elements of need and ability to pay

have been shown.
As such, Mrs. Kirk as the prevailing party on appeal, with
minimum financial resources of her own, should be awarded all
5

attorney's

fees

and

costs

she

connection

with

the

briefing

has
and

been

required

arguing

of

to

this

incur

appeal

in
and

responding to the many post trial motions filed by Mr. Kirk with
this Court and the district court.
Mr. Kirk's request for his attorney's fees on appeal should be
denied for three reasons:
1)

The request was raised for the first time in his

Reply Brief contrary to the provisions of Rule 24 (c)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
2)

The briefs demonstrate that Mr. Kirk should not be

the prevailing party in connection with this appeal; and
3)

Mr. Kirk has completely failed to demonstrate the

requisite elements of need on his part and ability to pay
on Mrs. Kirk's part.
Mrs. Kirk should be awarded the attorney's fees and costs she
has incurred in connection with this appeal.

The matter should be

remanded to the trial court for a determination and award of the
same.

CONCLUSION
A review of the testimony, exhibits, and briefs in this case
demonstrate:
1)

That the trial court's awards of alimony and attorney's

fees were appropriate given the respective financial situations of
each of the parties.
2)
of

those

There was substantial credible evidence to support both
awards

and

the Findings

sufficiently

set

forth

that

evidence and the trial court's reasoning in making those awards.
6

3)
evidence

Mr.

Kirk

has

in

favor

of

failed
the

in

trial

his

burden

court's

to

marshall

findings

the

and

then

Kirk

less

demonstrate the insufficiency of that evidence.
4)

The

trial

court

erred

in

awarding

Mrs.

attorney's fees than she had requested and not setting forth its
reasons for so doing.
5)

The parties entered in to a valid post-nuptial agreement

and the trial court erred in not enforcing the same as it related
to the properties each of the parties transferred into the trust.
6)

Mrs. Kirk, not Mr. Kirk, is entitled to be reimbursed all

of the attorney's fees and costs she has incurred in connection
with this appeal.
As such, Mrs. Kirk asks this Court to grant her the relief she
has requested on pages 4 and 5 of her principal Brief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of November, 1994.
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